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Meffert et al.: Domestic Relations

DOMESTIC RELATIONS
I.

A.

SEPARATION AGREEMENTS

Family Court Jurisdiction

In Kelly v. Edwards,1 the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
interpret and enforce a separation agreement that was incorporated, but not merged in the divorce decree. It is clear from this
decision that incorporation in the divorce decree alone is not
sufficient to bring a separation agreement within the family
court's jurisdiction if the agreement provides that it is not to be
merged into the decree.
The parties in Kelly entered into a separation agreement
that included a nonmerger clause. The agreement expressly provided that it was to survive the divorce decree as a binding and
conclusive contract between the parties. 2 A divorce decree was
subsequently granted incorporating the separation agreement.
Several years after the divorce, the wife brought an action to
enforce the separation agreement in family court. The trial judge
ordered the husband to pay child support and perform other
acts under the agreement.3 On appeal, the supreme court vacated the order and remanded the case to the family court with
instructions that it be transferred to the Court of Common
Pleas.4
The supreme court found that the nonmerger provision of
the separation agreement evidenced the parties' intent to be
contractually bound by the agreement. 5 Only the interpretation
of the contract was at issue. The court concluded that because
the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to determine
contractual obligations, the case was not properly before the

1. 276 S.C. 368, 278 S.E.2d 773 (1981).
2. Id. at 369, 278 S.E.2d at 774.
3. Id. at 369, 278 S.E.2d at 773.
4. Id. at 370, 278 S.E.2d at 774.
5. Id.
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family court."
In so ruling, the supreme court relied on its earlier decision
in Zwerling v. Zwerling.7 The Zwerling decision concerned a
separation agreement that was not incorporated into the divorce
decree. The court held that since the agreement was not "incorporated or merged" into the decree, the dispute was contractual
and therefore not within the family court's jurisdiction., The
Kelly decision emphasizes that merger into the decree is essential even when the agreement has been incorporated.9
The decisions in Zwerling and Kelly raise a question in
light of other recent decisions in the domestic relations area.
Prior decisions have imposed a duty on family court judges to
rule on the fairness of property settlement agreements which
come before them for incorporation into the divorce decree.10
Whether an agreement which the parties wish to survive their
divorce decree is also subject to the "fairness" test is unclear. A
literal reading of Zwerling and Kelly implies that a nonmerged
agreement is not within the jurisdiction of the family court,
whether for enforcement or examination of fairness.
Kelly provides a clear rule for practitioners to follow: a nonmerger clause in a separation agreement will bar the family
court's jurisdiction to enforce the agreement even though it is
incorporated into the divorce decree. Merger should be expressly
provided for if the parties wish the family court to retain jurisdiction to enforce the separation agreement.
Judy G. Meffert

6. Id.
7. 273 S.C. 292, 255 S.E.2d 850 (1979). For a discussion of Zwerling, see Domestic
Relations, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 32 S.C.L. REv. 105, 114 (1980).
8. 273 S.C. at 294-95, 255 S.E.2d at 852. See also, Fielden v. Fielden, 274 S.C. 219,
262 S.E.2d 43 (1980)(holding that the dispute was contractual in nature because "the
trial record was void of any indication that [the] agreement was incorporated or
merged. . ").
9. For an excellent discussion of the effects of incorporation and merger, see Propper, The Judgment of Dissolutionand the Agreement-Incorporation,Merger, Integration and Approval, 51 L.A.B.J. 177 (1975).
10. Drawdy v. Drawdy, 275 S.C. 76, 268 S.E.2d 30 (1980); McKinney v. McKinney,
274 S.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 526 (1980).
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Unenforceability of ContractualRelease From Child
Support Obligation

1 the South Carolina Supreme
In Lunsford v. Lunsford,"
Court considered the validity of a separation agreement incorporated into a divorce decree1 2 releasing one parent from child
support obligations. The court held that a parent's legal obligation to support minor children may not be extinguished by
agreement between the parents or third parties.13 Although the
agreement was invalid, the denial of child support was upheld
because the defendant husband was1 4 financially less able than
the plaintiff to support the children.
In 1974, at the time of the divorce decree releasing the defendant from the child support obligation, each party earned approximately $10,000 each year. In 1979, because of escalated
costs of child care,15 the wife, who then earned $20,000 a year,
and a guardian ad litem petitioned for child support from the
husband who continued to earn $10,000 each year.1 ' The family
court denied child support payments and the plaintiff appealed.
In holding the agreement invalid, the supreme court reasoned
that the support of minor children is a legal obligation which
continues after a divorce.17 Support is a "basic right of minor
children" that cannot be affected by agreement between parents
or third parties.18 The court recognized, however, that the right
of the children to support must be balanced against the financial
realities of the case. The wife's standard of living had improved
whereas the husband's financial status had declined.19 The court
concluded that the relative financial ability of each parent to
support the children required denial of child support to the

11. S.C. -,
282 S.E.2d 861 (1981).
12. See Kelly v. Edwards, 276 S.C. 368, 278 S.E.2d 773 (1981).
13. S.C. at -,
282 S.E.2d at 862.
14. Id. at -,
282 S.E.2d at 863.
15. Record at 12.
16. S.C. at -,
282 S.E.2d at 862.
17. Id. See, e.g., Lee v. Lee, 237 S.C. 532, 538, 118 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1961); Campbell
v. Campbell, 200 S.C. 67, 73, 20 S.E.2d 237, 239 (1942).
18. S.C. at -,
282 S.E.2d at 862 (citing Armour v. Allen, 377 So. 2d 798 (Fla.
App. 1979) in which the Florida court commented that child support is a right belonging
to every minor child imposed on both parents for the good of society and parents may
not contractually divest themselves of this obligation).
19. S.C. at -,
282 S.E.2d at 862.
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wife.20
The court's invalidation of a contractual release from child
support obligations protects the child's legal right to support. It
is within the discretion of lower courts to consider both the
needs of the child and the parent's ability to pay when determining the amount of support contribution.21 In Lunsford, the
court noted that the children's financial needs could be adequately met by the wife's financial ability at that time.22 The
husband, however, was not permanently excused from his support obligation, which remains subject to the court's discretionary enforcement upon a proper showing of a change in
circumstances. 23
It is clear from the Lunsford decision that a release by a
separation agreement incorporated into a divorce decree will not
stand to bar the court's authority to require a parent's contribution for child support. Although denial of child support was upheld in this case, the court asserted its discretionary power to
consider the needs of the children and the parent's ability to pay
in reaching its result.
FrancisE. Grimball
II. DIVORCE ACTIONS
A.

Award of Alimony

In Lide v. Lide,2 4 the South Carolina Supreme Court reiterated the factors to be considered in awarding alimony. Because
the family court judge had apparently neglected a full analysis
of all of these factors, the supreme court held that the denial of
alimony in Lide was an abuse of discretion.2 This decision em20. Id. at

-,

282 S.E.2d at 863.

21. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 264 S.C. 624, 628, 216 S.E.2d 541, 543 (1975); Lowe v.
Lowe, 256 S.C. 243, 246, 182 S.E.2d 75, 76-77 (1971); Graham v. Graham, 253 S.C. 486,
491-92, 171 S.E.2d 704, 707 (1970).
22.

-

S.C. at

-,

282 S.E.2d at 862-63.

23. The court is statutorily vested with the authority to increase, decrease, or terminate child support upon a proper showing of a change of conditions. S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-3-160 (1976). See, e.g., Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 447, 234 S.E.2d 774, 775
(1977).
24. - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 832 (1981).
25. The court has recognized that the determination of alimony is not amenable to
calculation by mathmatical formula and has generally left it with the discretion of the
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phasizes that no one factor is dispositive and all the facts and
circumstances must be considered in determining whether alimony should be awarded.
In Lide, the family court granted a divorce to the husband
and awarded child custody to the wife. 6 The court further ordered the husband to make monthly child support payments
and convey a portion of the marital property to the wife, but
denied the wife's prayer for alimonyY7 In announcing the denial
of alimony, the family court judge stated only that both the petitioner and the respondent had assets and were able-bodied and
employed. He therefore found no reason to award alimony to the
petitioner.28 On appeal, the supreme court found an abuse of
discretion by the trial judge in his denial of alimony and remanded the case for a determination of the appropriate amount.
In its analysis, the supreme court cited Powers v. Powers29
and Nienow v. Nienowso for a list of nine factors that should be
considered in making an alimony award. These factors include:
(1) the financial condition of the husband and the needs of the
wife, (2) the age and health of the parties, their respective
earning capacity, their individual wealth, (3) the wife's contribution to the accumulation of their joint wealth, (4) the conduct of the parties, (5) the respective necessities of the parties,
(6) the standard of living of the wife at the time of the divorce,
(7) the duration of the marriage, (8) the ability of the husband

family court judge. See, e.g., Beasley v. Beasley, 264 S.C. 611, 612, 216 S.E.2d 535, 535
(1975); Graham v. Graham, 253 S.C. 486, 491, 171 S.E.2d 704, 707 (1970); Long v. Long,
247 S.C. 250, 252, 146 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1966). To support a finding of abuse of discretion,
"there must be a showing by appellant that the conclusions reached [by the lower court]
were without reasonable factual support, resulted in prejudice to the right of the appellant, and therefore, in the circumstances, amounted to an error of law." Darden v.
Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 195, 209 S.E.2d 42, 47 (1974).
26. The parties had been married for eighteen years and had two children. - S.C.
at

-,

283 S.E.2d at 833.

27. The family court also ordered the husband to pay $1,000 in attorney fees. On
appeal, the supreme court found this determination to be premature and remanded. Id.
at -, 283 S.E.2d at 834.
28. Record, vol. 2, at 384. The trial judge also stated that he had "considered the
financial condition of the parties and their needs, their health, age and their earning
capacities and the amount the wife has contributed to the husband's wealth." Id. at 38485. These factors, however, were cited only in the portion of the order which awarded the
equitable division of property.
29. 273 S.C. 51, 254 S.E.2d 289 (1979).
30. 268 S.C. 161, 232 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
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to pay alimony, and (9) the actual income of the parties.31,

2
The ages and health of the parties in Lide were comparable
and both were employed.33 The supreme court, however, considered the wife's contribution to the couple's joint wealth,3 ' the
disparity in their respective earning capacities3 5 and income,3 6
the wife's present needs, 37 and the couple's standard of living at
the time of the divorce 8 to support an award of alimony.
In light of the broad discretion generally accorded family

31. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 833. The court has also instructed family court
judges to consider the tax ramifications of an alimony award. Simmonds v. Simmonds,
225 S.C. 211, 215, 81 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1954).
32. The husband was forty-one years of age and the wife was forty. Both were in
good health. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 833.
33. The wife worked three days a week as an art teacher. The husband was an attorney. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 834. The court had previously held that the employment of
the wife is insufficient grounds for denying alimony. Nienow v. Nienow, 268 S.C. 161,
171, 232 S.E.2d 504, 509 (1977); Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C. 218, 224, 133 S.E.2d 323,
326 (1963).
34. During the early years of the marriage, the wife worked full time as a teacher
while the husband was in law school and beginning in practice. She later divided her
time between homemaking and a part-time job as an art teacher. - S.C. at -, 283
S.E.2d at 833. The wife argued in her brief that while she worked part time and cared for
the children, she gave up educational and employment opportunities so her husband's
career could flourish. Brief for Appellant at 14.
35. The court noted that the wife's "earning capacity as a teacher was considerably
less than that of her husband who was engaged in the private practice of law for over a
decade." - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 834. When asked why she had not sought a fulltime position following the breakup of the marriage, Mrs. Lide testified that she had not
held a job as an elementary teacher for several years and that the opportunities for full
time art instructors in the area were extremely limited. Record, vol. 2., at 214.
36. The husband's gross monthly income was nearly twice that of the wife. Most of
the wife's income was received from her husband for child support. The court also noted
that the husband had investments valued at $144,493.00, while the wife's investments
were valued at $52,000.00. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 834.
37. In spite of assistance from her husband, Mrs. Lide asserted that she had to take
money from her savings and borrow from her mother in order to meet her financial obligations. Record, vol. 1, at 16-17.
38. The court noted that the couple had "an active social life with membership in
two country clubs and a dancing club." - S.C. at _, 283 S.E.2d at 834. In prior decisions, the court has considered standard of living as a factor in determining alimony.
See, e.g., Nienow v. Nienow, 268 S.C. 161, 171, 232 S.E.2d 504, 509 (1977); Spence v.
Spence, 260 S.C. 526, 529, 197 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1973). One commentator has noted that
maintenance of the wife's standard of living cannot be imposed as a realistic objective of
alimony because "in most situations, it is an unfortunate reality that the standard of
living of both parties will be reduced. Two parties living separately cannot live as cheaply as two parties living together." The Continuing Legal Education Division of the South
Carolina Bar, Support and Alimony, July, 1979, at 7.
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courts in making alimony awards,

9

the reversal in Lide rein-

forces the court's position that the relative circumstances of the
parties must be given full consideration. The factors on which
the court based its analysis have been enumerated in previous
decisions. Lide, however, stands for the court's commitment that
no one factor may be allowed to overshadow a full consideration
of them all.
B. Property Distribution
In Baker v. Baker, 0 the South Carolina Supreme Court
continued to develop the special equity doctrine. This doctrine,
first applied in South Carolina in 1978,41 is an exception to the
common law notion that property rights of married persons are
to be determined solely by reference to title. 2 Upon divorce, a
husband or wife who has made "material contributions" to the
acquisition of marital property is 'entitled to a vested interest
and an equitable share in the disposition of such property, even
though the title is in the name of his or her spouse.' The supreme court in Baker defined "material contributions" in terms
of contributions above and beyond the spouse's "normal marital
obligations."4

The parties in Baker were married in June 1968. Shortly
thereafter, the husband was sent to Vietnam and served there
until 1971. The wife worked as a school teacher from the time of
their marriage until the parties separated. She mailed a monthly
check to her husband while he was overseas, thus enabling him
to deposit his entire check in his separate bank account. After
discharge, the husband returned to employment as an attorney
and continued to maintain a separate savings account, to which
his wife made periodic contributions. The husband also received
39. See supra note 25.
40. 276 S.C. 427, 279 S.E.2d 601 (1981).

41. Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978).
42. Freed and Foster, Divorce In the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q. 249
(1981).

43. See, e.g., Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980); Poniatowski
v. Poniatowski, 275 S.C. 11, 266 S.E.2d 787 (1980); Risinger v. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 253
S.E.2d 652 (1979); Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978). See generally,
Morris v. Morris, 268 S.C. 104, 232 S.E.2d 326 (1977); McKenzie v. McKenzie, 254 S.C.
372, 175 S.E.2d 628 (1980).
44. 276 S.C. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
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additional income from stocks, most of which he had purchased
prior to marriage. The parties separated in 1975 and after three
years were granted a no-fault divorce. The family court found
that the wife was entitled to a special equitable interest and
awarded her a one-half interest in the marital residence and a
forty percent interest in the marital stocks and savings in satisfaction thereof. Additionally, the court ordered the husband to
satisfy all liens on the marital residence. On appeal, the supreme
court sustained the wife's special equity claim but overturned
the lower court's award in part, holding that the husband should
not be required to satisfy the mortgage liens.45
The supreme court rejected the defendant husband's contention on appeal that an "income approach" should be used to
allocate marital property. 46 Under this approach, the wife would
receive an allocation based upon the proportion of her income to
her husband's.47 The court relied upon its earlier decision in
Wilson v. Wilson,48 which held that special equitable interests
are to be determined by weighing "the relative incomes and material contributions" of the parties. 49 The supreme court rea-

soned that adopting the "strict mathematical approach" suggested by the husband would ignore any other material
50
contributions the wife had made to the marriage.
Although relative income is fairly easy to determine, what
actions constitute material contributions are not. The court in
Baker noted that not every material contribution of a spouse
will give rise to special equity, stating that " 'special equity'
should be warranted only where there exist special facts and circumstances in favor of one party above and beyond normal marital obligations.

' 51

The South Carolina Supreme Court quoted

from the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Arrington v. Arrington52 to support its conclusion that:
Each party is expected to be a help and companion to the
other. We have not so far abandoned the idea of marriage as a
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 431, 279 S.E.2d at 603.
Id. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
Brief for Appellant at 11-17.
270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978).
Id. at 222, 241 S.E.2d at 569.
276 S.C. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 601.
Id. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
150 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1963).
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unity of man and wife as to figure equities on the basis of the
assistance one gives to the other in the performance of ordinary marital duties.53
Although the supreme court decided that the settlement
award should be vacated as excessively favorable to the wife, it
gave little indication as to the reason, noting only that "the preponderance of the evidence requires a modification of the trial
judge's order."5 The supreme court apparently based this finding on the fact that the family court judge had considered "normal marital obligations" in his calculations.
Baker offers scant assistance to the practitioner who seeks
clarification of what factors must be taken into consideration in
determining the amount of an equitable interest. In rejecting the
family court allocation, the opinion purports to disregard normal
marital duties. However, the court considered the wife's "devo-

tion" 5 and the fact that she had "generally attended to her normal household duties," ' two seemingly normal marital obligations, in awarding the wife special equity. There may be a
reconciliation of these divergent lines of reasoning, however, in
the court's suggestion that some factors may be accorded greater
weight when considered in light of the situation at the time the
contribution was made. In discussing the wife's devotion, the
court stated that "upon returning home, the wife's income and
devotion had an increased significance at a time when [the husband's] income was substantially lower than today. ' 57 Thus, per-

haps the performance of normal marital duties by one spouse
may create an equitable interest in the other spouse's property
when the value of the contribution is heightened by the circumstances of performance.
"Normal marital duties" remains an elusive term not easily
defined by inflexible court-made rules. Without a legal clarification of marital roles in a changing society, it may be impossible
to define the scope of these duties. In fact, any contributions
other than income may be considered ordinary marital duties.

53. 276 S.C. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 602 (citing Arrington v. Arrington, 150 So. 2d 473
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963)).
54. 276 S.C. at 431, 279 S.E.2d at 603.
55. Id. at 431, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
56. Id. at 430, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
57. Id. at 431, 279 S.E.2d at 602.
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Indeed, Florida courts seem to have so broadly defined marital
duties as to preclude consideration of any factors other than direct monetary contributions and service in a spouse's business.5
South Carolina may possibly do the same in its continuing development of the special equity doctrine.
C. Equitable Distribution
In Jeffords v. Hall, 9 the South Carolina Supreme Court
tacitly approved the adoption of equitable distribution as another means of adjudicating property rights of divorcing parties.
Though some commentators have used the terms "special equity" and "equitable distribution" interchangeably, e° there is a
sharp distinction between the two doctrines. "Equitable distribution" properly refers to a system of apportionment adopted in
several no-fault divorce states, most notably New Jersey."1
Under this doctrine, courts have blanket authority to make a
distribution of property between the parties to a divorce along
equitable lines. Neither spouse must show that he or she has
made material contributions to the other spouse's acquisition of
property, or that he or she is entitled to a vested property interest. Rather, the couple seeking divorce requests the court to create its own fair settlement.6 2 Conversely, South Carolina has followed Florida's lead in adopting the special equity doctrine
which allows courts to award a spouse an interest in property
acquired or held in the name of the other spouse, provided the
party seeking the award made material contributions toward the
acquisition.
The parties in Jeffords had been married for thirty years, 3
58. See, e.g., Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.2d 949 (Fla. 1980); Bird v. Bird, 385 So.2d
1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Rozzano v. Rozzano, 307 So. 2d 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975). See also Chastain, Henry & Woodside, Determinationof Property Rights Upon
Divorce in South Carolina:An Exploration and Recommendation, 33 S.C.L. REv. 227,
238 (1981)[hereinafter cited as Chastain].
59. 276 S.C. 271, 277 S.E.2d 703 (1981).
60. Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of South CarolinaLaw, 33 S.C.L. REv. 75
(1981).
61. Freed and Foster, supra note 42, at 250-52.
62. Id. at 251-52.
63. The first eighteen years of the marriage were common law and the last twelve
years were ceremonial. Thus, the question as to whether the same considerations would
apply in a purely common law marriage was not before the court. This issue has been
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during which time the wife had worked on a regular basis and

had used her money for furnishings, food, clothes, and support
of the family. She also paid for repairs and refurbishment of the
marital residence, which her husband had inherited prior to
marriage.6 4 The husband was disabled and had been an invalid
for extended periods. He never filed an income tax return and he
testified that his income had been so small that he did not believe he was required to file. The trial court granted the husband
a no-fault divorce and ordered him to make an equitable distribution of the marital property and a lump sum alimony payment. The total payment could be satisfied by transfer of the
marital residence to the wife, such transfer being required if the
husband did not make full payment within ten days.6 5 On ap-

peal, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the order of
equitable distribution and lump sum alimony.66
The supreme court reasoned that the wife's continued employment during the marriage supported the award of equitable
distribution.6 7 This employment was deemed sufficient to meet
the "material contribution" standard announced in Wilson v.
Wilson."5 Thus, although the phrase "equitable distribution"
was used in Baker, the court applied the special equity standards it had developed in earlier cases.
Jeffords marks the first time the term "equitable distribu-

addressed by the Florida Supreme Court in Budd v. J.Y. Gooch Co., 157 Fla. 716, 27 So.
2d 72 (1946). In Budd, the court held that the same equitable considerations apply in
adjudicating the property rights of parties in a common law marriage as in a ceremonial
marriage.
64. Record at 203-05. The fact that the wife's contribution was made for improvements rather than acquisition of the marital property was not discussed. Florida courts,
however, have recognized that contributions toward improvements are sufficient to create an equitable interest. See, e.g., Forehand v. Forehand, 363 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1978);
Stoutamire v. Stoutamire, 321 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1975); Francis v. Francis, 133 Fla. 495,
182 So. 833 (1938).
65. Record at 214-15.
66. 276 S.C. at 274, 277 S.E.2d at 705. During the pendency of the divorce proceedings and prior to the issuance of the lower court's order, the husband had transferred the
residence to his sister. The family judge interpleaded the sister and ordered her to reconvey the property to her brother. The supreme court reversed this portion of the order as
violative of the sister's due process rights. The supreme court, in a footnote, specifically
declined to rule on the propriety of the transfer. Id. at 274 and n.1, 277 S.E.2d at 704-05
and n.1.
67. Id. S.C. at 273-74, 277 S.E.2d at 704 (citing Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241
S.E.2d 566 (1978)).
68. 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978).

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

136

South
Carolina
Law Review,
34, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 9[Vol. 34
REVIEW
LAWVol.
CAROLINA
SOUTH

tion" has been used in a South Carolina Supreme Court decision. The court's use of the term, which arguably implies that
the doctrine has been accepted in this state, does little to advance either the doctrine of equitable distribution or special equity in South Carolina. In fact, the decision's primary significance seems to be the confusion that it casts upon this area of
the law.
The use of the term "equitable distribution" in Jeffords
may have simply been a misnomer. There is a possibility, however, that it was indeed intentional and indicates the advent of a
new approach*to property disposition in this state. At least one
commentator has stated that South Carolina now has both the
doctrines of special equity and equitable distribution operating
concurrently." This possibility is strengthened by subsequent
legislative and judicial developments. The South Carolina General Assembly has recently adopted an act that gives the family
courts jurisdiction to make a disposition of property rights of
the parties "if requested by either party in the pleadings."70
Furthermore, in a recent decision, Glass v. Glass,71 the supreme

court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint seeking an
"equitable distribution based upon the material contributions of
the wife to the marriage." In holding the doctrine constitutional,
of special equity
however, the court again used the 7 language
2
cases and cited Wilson as authority.
It is thus difficult to say from Jeffords whether the supreme
court has adopted equitable distribution as an alternative remedy, whether the court intends to apply some sort of compromise between the two doctrines, or whether the use of the term
was a mere misnomer. If South Carolina has indeed adopted equitable distribution, it is probably following the lead of Florida.
South Carolina opinions have relied heavily on Florida for guidance, and two recent Florida cases indicate that Florida has
now adopted equitable distribution as an alternative method of
property disposition. 3 If the South Carolina Supreme Court has

69. Chastain, supra note 58, at 234.
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (Supp. 1980).
S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 221 (1981).
71. 72. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 222.
73. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980); Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.
2d 949 (Fla. 1980).
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not yet adopted the equitable distribution doctrine, these Florida decisions suggest that its adoption may be imminent.
Jerrold H. Hillard
III.

CHILD CUSTODY: JURISDICTION FOR MODIFICATION OF
DECREE

In Smollar v. Smollar, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the family court which determines child custody in a
divorce proceeding "retains jurisdiction to modify the decree
even though the parent having custody, and the child, move
from the state. 7'5 The significance of this decision is its consistency with the provisions of the recently enacted Uniform Child
7
Custody Jurisdiction Act (U.C.C.J.A.).

6

The parties in Smollar were divorced in January 1980 and
Mrs. Smollar was awarded custody of the minor child, in addition to child support and alimony. In February 1980, Mrs.
Smollar was remarried in Texas and thereafter maintained a
Texas residency and domicile.78 Mr. Smollar filed a summons
and petition in the Richland County Family Court in March
1980, to have the divorce decree amended.7 9 Mrs. Smollar subsequently made a special appearance before the court to contest
the court's personal jurisdiction over her. 0 The lower court denied Mrs. Smollar's motion, holding that the Richland County
Family Court retained jurisdiction. The supreme court
affirmed."'
The court reasoned that if the family court could maintain
jurisdiction when a party moves to another location within the
state, it likewise should retain jurisdiction when a party moves
out of state.8 2 The court further supported its decision by rely74.

-

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

-

S.C. -,
280 S.E.2d 543 (1981).
S.C. at -,
280 S.E.2d at 544.
1981 S.C. Acts 351, No. 102.
S.C. at -,
280 S.E.2d at 543.
Record at 1.
S.C. at -,
280 S.E.2d at 543.
Record at 2.
S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 544.
The court cited Clinkscales v. Clinkscales, 243 S.C. 377, 134 S.E.2d 216 (1963),

to support this analogy. In Clinkscales, the wife did not leave the state but merely
moved from Anderson to Greenville. The case is not truly analogous, because the husband sought to have the custody award modified in the court of the county of the wife's
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ing on the majority view that "once the divorce court gains jurisdiction to determine custody, it retains jurisdiction to modify
the decree even though the parent having custody and the child
move from the state.18 3 The court concluded that if it did not
recognize the continuing jurisdiction of the family court which
had initial jurisdiction, the issue of custody could be relitigated
4
by a different court everytime a child was moved.
Smollar v. Smollar is correct in its holding that the
"[f]amily [c]ourt had personal jurisdiction over both parties and
the minor child when the divorce decree was issued" and that it
had "jurisdiction over this case. 5 Although the decision is silent
concerning the effect of the U.C.C.J.A., which had been signed
into law eight days before the decision wag handed down,"" the
result in Smollar would probably have been the same under the
U.C.C.J.A. 8 7 The notice given to Mrs. Smollar complied with the
new statute, 8 and because the child had been gone less than six
months, 9 Texas courts would probably not have had jurisdiction . 0 The applicability and effect of the U.C.C.J.A. was not
raised in the briefs, and it is unclear whether it would have been
applied retroactively. It would have been a helpful indication for
future cases if the court had cited the Act in support of its
new residence. The court held that since the decree was from the court in Anderson, only
that court could modify it.
83. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 544. The U.C.C.J.A. is the controlling rule in fortytwo states. See 4 A.L.R.2D 7 (1949) and 96 A.L.R. 3D 968 (1980).
84. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 544. This reasoning is implicit in the general purposes of the U.C.C.J.A., 1981 S.C. Acts 351, 352, No. 102 at § 20-7-784.
85. - S.C. at -, 280 S.E.2d at 544.
86. The U.C.C.J.A. was approved by the legislature June 15, 1981 and was effective
upon the governor's signing it on July 1, 1981. The Smollar decision is dated July 9,
1981.
87. See, e.g., Allison v. Superior Ct. of Los Angeles, 99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 309 (1979); Hofer v. Agner, 373 So. 2d 48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Fortson v.
Fortson, 152 Ga. App. 326, 262 S.E.2d 599 (1979).
88. 1981 S.C. Acts 351, 355, No. 102, at § 20-7-792.
89. Id. at 354, § 20-7-788(a)(1)(ii).
90. Id. at 354, § 20-7-788(a)(4)(i); TEx. FAM. CODE. ANN., § 11.053 (Vernon Supp.
1981). The U.C.C.J.A. as found in Uniform Laws Annotated contains the model for this
section of the Texas Code. However, in the Texas Code "Recognition of Out-of-State
Decrees" is limited to those made in compliance with statutory authority similar to the
U.C.C.J.A., whereas in the model U.C.C.J.A. the requirements for recognition of out-ofstate decrees do not require statutory authority so long as the court follows a course
similar to that espoused in the U.C.C.J.A. Thus, under U.C.C.J.A. § 13, the South Carolina decree would clearly be recognized, but the result under the Texas version is not as
clear.
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decision.91
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of Smollar is the court's
decision not to address due process considerations.9 2 The appellant, Mrs. Smollar, argued in her brief that her fourteenth
amendment right to due process was violated by the court's "requiring. . . [her] to come to South Carolina to decide personal
rights whe[n] . . . [she] has validly changed . .. her place of
domicile and residence" to Texas. 93 The court chose not to address this issue and instead relied on its determination that if it
did not affirm jurisdiction, then child custody would be subject
to an infinite string of decisions with each court "exercising appellate powers over the acts of another court of equal jurisdiction.94 The South Carolina Supreme Court is not the only court
to sidestep the due process problems inherent in this kind of
case. Other courts have also put due process arguments aside for
the benefit of the children involved. 5
Even though the U.C.C.J.A. is now in effect in South Carolina, and future custody questions will be decided under it,
Smollar v. Smollar is useful as a foreshadowing of how the
South Carolina Supreme Court will react to the U.C.C.J.A. It is
likely that if the court decided a case in line with the statute
without expressly mentioning the statute, as it did in Smollar, a
later action brought under the statute would be similarly
decided.

IV.

ADOPTION: GOOD CAUSE REQUIREMENT FOR RELEASE OF
IDENTIFYING INFORMATION

To

ADOPTEE

In Bradey v. Children's Bureau of South Carolina,96 the
South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the
statutory "good cause" requirement for release of identifying in91. The U.C.C.J.A. has been adopted by every state except Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Tennessee.
92. A discussion of this due process problem can be found in Commentary, The Due
Process Dilemma of the Uniform Child Custody JurisdictionAct, 6 OHIo N.U.L. REV.
586 (1979).
93. Brief for Appellant at 3-4.
94. S.C. at -,
280 S.E.2d at 544 (quoting Williams v. Woolfolk, 188 Va. 312,
319, 49 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1948)).
95. See, May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953); Dowden v. Fischer, 338 S.W.2d 534
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
96. 275 S.C. 622, 274 S.E.2d 418 (1981).
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formation from an adoption file.97 The court held that the plaintiff must show extraordinary circumstances sufficient to support
the finding of a "compelling need" for such disclosure.", This
interpretation of the "good cause" requirement is consistent
with the approach taken in a majority of American
jurisdictions."'
Plaintiff Bradey was adopted as an infant in South Carolina
in 1947. Although he led a relatively stable life as an adult, the
plaintiff experienced a continuing emotional need to locate his
natural parents. Brady contacted the defendant Children's Bureau which, pursuant to statute, 10 provided him with only nonidentifying information in his adoption file. Unsatisfied, he
brought an action against the defendant to compel disclosure of
the remaining information.
The trial court determined that Bradey's "sincere and genuine desire to learn the truth of his birth"'10 1 constituted "good
cause" under section 15-14-140(c) of the South Carolina Code.
The court decided to review the adoption file in camera and contact the natural parents to determine whether they would object
to the release of their identities. The court then proposed to
hold a subsequent hearing' 2 to allow the State to present any
97. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45-140(c)(1976)(current version at § 20-7-1780(c)(Supp.
1981)) provides:
All files and records pertaining to the adoption proceedings in the Children's
Bureau in the State of South Carolina, or in the Department of Social Services
of the State of South Carolina, or in any authorized agency, shall be confidential and withheld from inspection except upon order of court for good cause
shown.
An agency may release nonidentifying information pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45140(d)(1976)(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1780(d)(Supp. 1981)).
98. 275 S.C. at 627, 274 S.E.2d at 421-22.
99. See, e.g., Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Hubbard v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 741, 11 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1961); In re Roger B., 85
Ill. App. 3d 1064, 407 N.E.2d 884 (1980); Kirsch v. Parker, 383 So. 2d 384 (La. 1980); In
re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978); In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1978); Mill v.
Atlantic City Dep't. of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1972); In re
Linda F.M., 95 Misc. 2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1978); In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d
224, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. 1977); In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779
(1976); In re Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 232 S.E.2d 479 (1977); In re Sage, 21 Wash. App.
803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978).
100. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45-140(d)(1976)(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-71780 (Supp. 1981)).
101. Record at 10.
102. This hearing presumably was to be held only if the natural parents agreed to
the release of their identities. Record at 16.
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compelling reasons for maintaining the confidentiality of the
records. 10 3 The Children's Bureau appealed and the supreme
court reversed, concluding that the finding of good cause and the
order for in camera inspection were unsupported by the record
104
and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion.
The supreme court agreed with the Children's Bureau that
Bradey had made an insufficient showing of good cause, holding
that good cause required that the demanding party demonstrate
"compelling need"10 5 and "extraordinary circumstances"1 0 6 to
justify opening a sealed adoption record. The court used these
terms to define good cause to emphasize the need for confidentiality in the adoption process.1 07 The court further concluded
that the natural parents had a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy arising from the statute. 10 8 The supreme court
noted, however, that the requirement of confidentiality and the
rights of the natural parents are not absolute. The adoption
statute would allow a party access to identifying information
upon a showing of compelling need.1 09 Compelling need would be

103. This procedure shifted the burden to the State to show good cause why the
records should remain sealed. Several jurisdictions have adopted this procedure. See,
e.g., In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. 1978)(adoptee's interests predominate when he
is an adult); Mills v. Atlantic City Dep't. of Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372
A.2d 646 (1977)(where there are adult adoptees involved, the burden shifts to the State
to show good cause does not exist).
104. 275 S.C. at 624, 274 S.E.2d at 420. The court also addressed Bradey's claim
that S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45-140(c) (Supp. 1976) violated his equal protection rights.
The court found that the adoptee's status under the law did not place him in a suspect
class and that the constitutional test is thus whether the separate classification has a
reasonable relation to the purposes of the challenged legislation. The court concluded
that in this case "there most assuredly is" such a relationship. 275 S.C. at 629, 274
S.E.2d at 422 (citing Alma Society, Inc. v. Mellon, 459 F. Supp. 912 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In
re Roger B., 85 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 407 N.E.2d 884 (1980); Mill v. Atlantic City Dep't. of
Vital Statistics, 148 N.J. Super. 302, 372 A.2d 646 (1972); and In re Sage, 21 Wash. App.
803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978)).
105. 275 S.C. at 627, 274 S.E.2d at 421.
106. Id. at 629, 274 S.E.2d at 422.
107. Id. at 627-28, 274 S.E.2d at 421-22. The court in its opinion included with approval a lengthy quotation from In re Maples, 563 S.W.2d 760, 763-64 (Mo. 1978), in
which the Missouri Supreme Court discussed the risks attendant to a rapid change in the
policy of preserving the anonymity of biological parents and affirmed the validity of that
policy. 275 S.C. at 627-28, 274 S.E.2d at 421-22.
108. 275 S.C. at 626-27, 274 S.E.2d at 421 (citations omitted). For a further discussion of this aspect of the Bradey decision, see ConstitutionalLaw, Annual Survey of
South CarolinaLaw, 34 S.C.L. REv. 43, 45 (1982).
109. 275 S.C. at 627-28, 274 S.E.2d at 421.
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weighed against not only the interests of the natural parents,
but also against the State's interest in maintaining an effective
adoption process. Disclosure would be allowed where "the need
for identifying information. . . outweigh[s] the general need for
confidentiality."' 110 The court stated that the facts and circumstances of each case determine what constitutes a compelling
need for identifying information.""
In rejecting Bradey's claim for access to his adoption files,
the court found that the existence of "some insecurity," "some
distraction," and "sincere desire" did not demonstrate a compelling need for identifying information and therefore did not justify disclosure.'1 2 Although the court did not doubt Bradey's
sincerity, it found that "when this desire is measured against the
substantial interest of the State in an ongoing adoption institution based upon confidentiality, the desire comes up short. Disclosure follows in extraordinary circumstances. Bradey's circumstance simply is not extraordinary.""'
The court found it
significant that Bradey had not required medical assistance for
his emotional
distress and he enjoyed a relatively stable personal
4
life."

The supreme court's decision in Bradey places South Carolina law in line with the majority of American jurisdictions
which have interpreted "good cause" as requiring a showing of
compelling need. As in Bradey, the existence or nonexistence of
extraordinary circumstances has been held determinative of
whether there is a compelling need. For example, the desire of a
Mormon to discover his ancestry for religious reasons,11 5 the desire to ascertain possible inheritance rights," 6 the existence of a
110. Id. at 627, 274 S.E.2d at 421.
111. Id..
112. Id. at 627-28, 274 S.E.2d at 422.
113. Id. at 629, 274 S.E.2d at 422.
114. Id..
115. In re Gilbert, 563 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. 1978). The adoptee claimed two reasons for
disclosure. She stated the first reason as "I'm trying to find them out of interest, curiosity and perhaps even love." 563 S.W.2d at 769. The case was remanded based on the
second reason, which was "that an individual may be inspired by sincere religious beliefs." Id. at 770.
116. In Louisiana, the adoptee retains the right to inherit from his natural parents.
Kirsch v. Parker, 383 So.2d 384 (La. 1980); Massey v. Parker, 369 So.2d 1310 (La. 1979);
Chambers v. Parker, 349 So. 2d 424 (La. Ct. App. 1977). In Kirsch the plaintiff also
suffered from flashbacks to her pre-adoption childhood and the court recognized that
medical proof of this affliction would likely constitute good cause for disclosure. 383
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severe personality dysfunction, 117 the need for a specific type of
blood,-" s fear of hereditary disease,"' and most common of all,
the adoptee's psychological need to know'2 0 have all been held to
justify disclosure of confidential adoption records.
Conversely, courts have consistently refused to recognize
mere desire or curiosity as sufficient to constitute good cause.12
Courts have also refused to unseal adoption records for a man
suing his former wife's present husband for alienation of affections,'2 2 for a man who needed the sealed information to aid his
defense in a paternity suit, 2 3 and for a charitable organization
wishing to assert a superior claim over the inheritance claims of
adopted children. 1 24 Thus, while somewhat lacking insofar as

So.2d at 387-88. Kirsch was remanded for the appointment of a curator ad hoc and to
allow the plaintiff to prove that her flashbacks were caused by the ignorance of her origins. Id. An interest in inheritance from the natural parents would not be recognized in
South Carolina because the relationship between the parents and adoptee is completely
severed. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45-130 (1976)(current version at S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-71770 (Supp. 1981)). See also, Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law, 29 S.C.L. REV. 99, 112 (1978).
117. In re Anonymous, 92 Misc. 2d 224, 399 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. 1977). The court
described plaintiff as a "deeply troubled young man." Id. at 226, 399 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
118. In re Spinks, 32 N.C. App. 422, 232 S.E.2d 479 (1977). This action was remanded to the trial court with instructions that it consider medical necessity, such as the
need for a specific type of blood, and severe emotional or psychological difficulties. The
court also stated that "we think the confidentiality required by our adoption statutes
should be protected except in compelling cases." 32 N.C. App. at 426, 232 S.E.2d at 482.
119. In re Sage, 21 Wash. App. 803, 586 P.2d 1201 (1978). The court noted that at
trial the plaintiff adoptee had not, as requested, produced affidavits detailing his fear of
hereditary heart disease. The court implied that these affidavits could have provided the
necessary showing of good cause. 21 Wash. App. at 811, 586 P.2d at 1206.
120. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 89 Misc. 2d 132, 390 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1976). The
plaintiff asserted as good cause that he was suffering from a psychological disorder resulting from his not knowing his true identity and that obtaining such knowledge would
be "beneficial to his present emotional state." 89 Misc. 2d at 134, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
121. See, e.g., In re Hayden, - Misc. 2d -, 435 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1981); In re Linda
F.M., 95 Misc. 2d 581, 409 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1978). The adoptee argued unsuccessfully that
the lack of full knowledge about her origins had caused psychological problems which
impaired her artistic skills and led to the breakup of her marriage. A psychologist testified that the plaintiff was in the middle range of adoptees-she showed no unusual adjustment problems. The request for disclosure was dismissed with the court stating that
"[t]his need must rise above mere desire or curiosity." 95 Misc. 2d at -, 409 N.Y.S.2d
at 641.
122. In re Glasser, 198 Misc. 889, 100 N.Y.S.2d 723 (1950)(plaintiff's request to unseal two records that he believed contained information helpful to his suit denied).
123. In re Minicozzi, 51 Misc. 2d 595, 273 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1966).
124. Hubbard v. Superior Court of Yuba County, 189 Cal. App. 2d 741, 11 Cal. Rptr.
700 (1961). This was an action brought to enable the Lincoln Center for the Performing
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predictability, the extraordinary circumstances approach is perhaps best given the great diversity of the backgrounds and circumstances facing adoptees.
Furthermore, the court in Bradey did not expressly disapprove of the trial court's disclosure procedures to be followed
when an adoptee proves good cause. The court only disagreed
with the existence of good cause. This suggests that such a procedure may be acceptable in a case where the plaintiff has been
able to establish good cause.
The decision in Bradey reflects the South Carolina Supreme
Court's intention to balance the needs of an adoptee against
those of the parents and the state in determining the existence
of good cause. Good cause will be found where there are extraordinary circumstances which justify the finding of a compelling need for disclosure of confidential information in an adoption file. Once such a showing has been made, courts will
establish procedures to be followed in disclosure. These procedures should be designed to protect the interests of the adoptee,
the parents, and the state.
Michael Warshauer

Arts to show that the children adopted by an heir to John D. Rockefeller, Sr., were
improperly adopted. The Lincoln Center's theory was that if it could prove impropriety
in the adoption it would receive $9,700,000 from the trust that otherwise would belong to
the adoptees. The court determined that this reason did not constitute good cause.
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